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Summary:
This paper examines the impact the TMI (Three Mile Island) accident had
on investors' risk perceptions of utilities with nuclear generating capacity.
Two methods of analysis are used to determine if the beta coefficients of
utilities changed due to TMI. Both methods indicate that the beta values
were similar before and after the TMI incident. The switching regression
method indicates the betas for the period following TMI were not signifi-
cantly different from the pre-TMI period. The beta component analysis
shows that the increased variability of holding period returns for the
nuclear utilities was offset by a decrease in the correlation between
the utilities' returns and the market's returns.
These results tend to support capital market theory. A nuclear accident
is a firm specific phenomenon, and in an efficient, well-diversified market
the im{>act on a diversified portfolio is small.

THE IMPACT OF "THREE MILE ISLAND" UPON
ELECTRIC UTILITIES' COST OF CAPITAL
The 28 March 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) accident added a new dimen-
sion to the ongoing debate over the private and social costs and benefits
of nuclear power. Utility executives commonly speculate "that the
Harrisburg accident will add billions of dollars to nuclear generating
costs that are already vastly higher than Imagined" [8]. Some indica-
tion of TMI's "financial fallout" became apparent when General Public
Utilities Corporation, which owns the stricken TMI reactor, cut its
quarterly dividend and told its stockholders on 9 May 1979 that unless
governmental subsidies for the accident costs were forthcoming, GPU
faced bankruptcy [1]. Not surprisingly, business and investment articles
on the electric utility industry immediately began presenting utility
data classified by the capacity percentage represented by nuclear power.
TMI made the cost-profit-solvency dimensions of "nuclear risk" more
apparent to investors and regulators. Whether the TMI incident altered
the required rate of return of equity investors in electric utilities
with nuclear generating capacity (hereafter nukes) is an important ques-
tion. If nukes are perceived to have greater risk than utilities without
nuclear generating capacity (hereafter non-nukes), then this differential
should be recognized in setting regulatory allowed rates of return and
in choosing among competing power generation sources.
It is the objective of this paper to examine equity investors' risk
perception of nukes in such a way as to be able to comment on whether
TMI changed investors perceived risk. The next section describes the
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switching regression and beta component analysis techniques used to de-
tect any TMI induced shift in the risk-return expectations of equity in-
vestors in nukes. Qnpirical results are presented in the third section.
Implications of the study are discussed in the final section.
DETECTING A SHIFT IN EQUITY INVESTORS'
RISK-RETURN EXPECTATIONS
The economic argument for nuclear power revolves around a hypothe-
sized cost advantage when construction, maintenance, operating, and
capital costs are compared over the economic lives of nuclear and fossil
power sources. Implicit in this economic argument is the assumption that
a utility's cost of capital will not increase if it goes "nuke" since a
small change in capital costs affecting the entire capitalization could
offset any construction-production economies associated with nuclear power
generation. This may have been a reasonable assumption in the 1950s and
early 1960s. However the debate over the social costs and benefits of
nuclear power in the 1970s, escalating construction costs, and operating
outages may have caused investors' perceptions of the risk-retxirn dimen-
sion of nuclear power to change importantly in the decade of the 19708.
If these developments did not attract utility investors' attention in
the 1970s, the TMI incident did. .
The term "nuclear risk" emerged in the investment community's jargon
following TMI. A utility's exposure to "nuclear risk" depends upon whether
the utility operates nuclear generating units or has nuclear plants under
construction, and the relative importance of nuclear versus fossil gener-
ating capacity. For utilities operating nuclear generating units, the
risk revolves around the expensive outage time and cost of continuously
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modifying existing units to "state of the art" technology. For utilities
with nuclear plants under construction, the risks are construction delays
and cost overruns arising from required modifications, and changing
licensing conditions [15]."
GPU and other nuke stocks experienced large price declines following
TMI, Figure 1 shows the weekly closing price of GPU common stock (Company
14) for the 72 week period, 16 June, 1978 to 27 October, 1979. The pre-
cipitous price decline between the forty-first and forty-second weeks
marks the week in which the TMI incident occurred. Inasmuch as the stock
market (S & P 425 Price Index) was progressing upward from week 20 through
week 69, an explanation for GPU's fifty percent price decline would ap-
pear to revolve around a change in investors' perceived risk and/or a
change in expected earnings.
Figure 2 provides price data for five electric utilities which de-
rive between 43 and 58 percent of their generation capacity from nuclear
2
units. Price data for these five nukes also show substantial price de-
terioration immediately following TMI. However, these firms displayed a
price resiliency not apparent in the GPU price data.
When price data for all nuke and non-nuke utilities are compared over
3
the 72 week period, the impact of TMI is not as apparent. The data in
Figure 3 show that other than a two month time span following TMI, the
price movements of the 17 nuke and 44 non-nuke utilities appear to covary
rather closely. Nuke prices declined rapidly after TMI while non-nuke
prices did not. But after a 6-8 week period, nuke and non-nuke price in-
dices appear to have resumed their pre-TMI relationship. However, the
mean price differential between the two groups declined after TMI as
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both sets of utilities appeared to follow general market movements less
closely. ^
The GPU, nuke, and non-nuke price data are generally consistent with
a modern portfolio theory interpretation of the TMI incident. Nuclear
risk or the financial fallout of a nuclear incident such as TMI is not
systematically associated with swings in the economy or the stock market.
In capital market terms, nuclear risk is unsystematic risk. Since diver-
sification in a portfolio can eliminate unsystematic risk, securities'
expected retinrns in an efficient capital market are a fvinction only of
their systematic risk and the time value of money. Accordingly, there
Is no a^ priori logic for expecting a TMI incident to influence the per-
ceived systematic risk of nukes and, thus, investors' required returns.
This is so even though the total risk perceived by investors in nuke
utilities likely increased with TMI.
Systematic risk can be measured by beta (g). 3 may be estimated
with historical price data to determine the relative risk of a security
or the required rate of return on equity using a model such as
^it = "i + ^i \kt^ -^ \t ' (^)
where R is the price and dividend holding period return on stock i in
time t and the tilde indicates a random variable, R
,
is a market re-
mkt
turn factor common to all assets, a and Bj ^'^^ the parameters to be esti-
mated, and e is the error term in the linear model. Moving 18 week
3s for weeks 18-71 are presented in Figure 4 for GPU, the 5 heavy nuclear
utilities, and the nuke and non-nuke groups. The 3 data show little dif-
ference between the relative risk of nuke and non-nuke utilities before
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TMI. Shortly after TMI, the 3s of both nukes and non-nukes declined. Non-
nuke 3s stayed at this lower level while the 3s of the nukes increased.
The last three observations of the "18 week moving 3 plots" are based on
holding period returns occurring 8-10 weeks after TMI. By the end of the
analysis period, the 3s of the nuke and non-nuke groups are not only
again comparable to each other, but are also comparable to their pre TMI
3 level.
The question of interest in this study is whether the observed changes
in 3 following TMI represented changes in the risk perceived by nuke and
non-nuke investors, or were the changes due to measurement errors between
"true beta" and the regression estimated beta. Two analytical methods
—
a dummy variable switching technique and an analysis of the components
of beta—are utilitized to examine the structural stability of the 3
risk measures.
Switching Regression Method
A dummy variable regression method developed by Gujarati [10] was
utilized to determine if and when structural changes occurred for each
individual utility. This dummy variable technique which tests for the
equality between two sets of regression coefficients can be expressed as
\t = ^0 " ^1^ ^ ^o\kt ^ \(^\kt) -^ ^t • ^2)
Here R ^ and R , are the random returns of the electric utility index
ut mkt '
and the market index, respectively; a-, a^ , b^, b, , are the regression
coefficients; and e' is the error term. The dummy variable, D, divides
the time period under consideration into two segments, thusly:
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D = 1 if the observation (Return) is in the first, n.,
weeks of the data, and
D = if the observation (Return) is in the second, n„,
weeks of the data.
The regression coefficients associated with the dunmy variable terms
represent the differential intercept, a^ , and the differential slope (beta)
coefficient, respectively. The intercept value for both periods is a^
unless a^ is statistically significant. If a. is statistically signifi-
cant, then the intercept value of the first n^ months is a„ + a^ and the
intercept value for the last n^ months is a.. Similarly, if b, is sig-
nificant, then b„ + b^ represents the slope (beta) for the first n^ months,
and b_ is the slope (beta) for the last n^ months. By changing the values
for VL. and n-, differential intercepts and slopes may be calculated over
the entire time period.
This study used 71 weeks of returns data, from 16 June, 1978 through
27 October, 1979. The length of the two segments, n. and n-, were changed
weekly such that 48 regressions were calculated using equation (2). For
example, n = 13 weeks and n„ = 58 weeks for the first regression;
n^ = 14 weeks and n„ = 57 weeks for the second regression. The first
segment, n^, was lengthened by one week and the second segment, n^, was
shortened by one week until for the last regression n. = 58, and n_ = 13.
Results of the switching regression analysis are presented in the follow-
ing section.
Beta Component Analysis
An analysis of the components of beta is also undertaken. The char-
acteristic line beta can be expressed as
-11-
COV(R. ,R
, ^ ) P. , ^ aR . oR _ p. ,^ o .1 mkt i.mkt i inkt i,mkt rl
^ VAeTt ;
' 2 ^R~~ ^^^
(R
,
^ ) crR , ^ mktmkt mkt
Equation (2) reveals that estimated g varies directly with p , and
aR , or the proportion of total return variability (risk) that is system-
atically associated with the market, and inversely with market variabil-
A firm's true beta measures the systematic association of E(R
, ) and
E(R ji)« Component analysis can provide insights into the dynamics of
g movements. An important source of measured 3 instability is the use of
observed holding period returns as though they are equilibrium returns.
Total period return (R,^) can be imagined as being composed of an equili-
brium return component and an adjustment return component or
R = R
-T + R J.
X equil adj
where
R_ = observed holding period return;
t
R ^ = an equilibrium holding period return consistent with
t beginning of the period values for a firm's 3 or sys-
tematic risk and the prevailing risk-return trading
terms (i.e., SML); and
R = a period price adjustment return required in order
^
-^t for end of holding period values for E(R^^j^ )» ^(.K. )»
E(3^,) to be consistent. t+1 t+1
Observed R_'s for a firm include price adjustment returns which occur
because of shifts in the prevailing trading terms for risk and return
or the security market line (SML), movements along the SML (i.e.,
changes in the firm's systematic risk), and/or changes in a firm's
expected earnings on assets. Clearly estimation bias and/or stability
-12-
problems arise because these R ,.'s create a discrepancy between the
theoretical return construct, R
.^, and the observable R_.
Consider, for example, a utility with a 3 of .5, a stock price of
$100 (Pn) > and expected earnings and dividends per share of $9 (D^). If
the risk free rate (R,) is 6.0% and the expected return on the market,
E(R
, ) is 12.0%, investors expect a nolding period return (R^ ) of
P _
^1 " ^0 "^ "l
_
$100 - $100 + $9
_ Q „„
\^
~
Pq ~ $100 ~ ^•"'^
A parallel upward shift in the SML during period one due to an increase
in R^ from 6.0% to 8.0% will cause R . , to increase to 11.0%. The only
f equil
way the $9 expected earnings-dividends rate can provide an 11.0% return
is for the price of the stock to decline to $81.82 ($81.82 = $9/. 11).
R,^ can be visualized as
^
$81.82 - $100 + $9
^^ $100 equil adj
-9.18% = 9.00% + (-18.18%)
The observed R,^ of -9.18% would be treated as an equilibrium holding
period return in estimating 3 from historical data. However, a -9.18%
return for this hypothetical firm would be an equilibrium return only
if the observed market return, R
, ,
were -26,36%. *
mkt
An unstable discrepancy between a firm's true beta and its regres-
sion estimated beta can arise due to the occurrence of R ,.'s which may
adj
cause observed R-,'s to map as outliers on the firm's true characteristic
line. The occurrence of R ,.'s due to shifts in or movements along the SML
adj
and changes in a utility's expected earnings on assets means estimation bias
-13-
rather than a structural shift in the E(R
.^) E(R , ) relationship may
account for observed B nonstationarity after TMI, The behavior of the
coi!5)onents of beta are examined for the nuke and non-nuke groups in an
attepmt to evaluate the significance of the post TMI 3 instability.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Switching Regression Analysis
A sviminary of the switching regression procedure is presented in
Table 1. The results for a group of 44 non-nuclear electric utilities,
a group of 17 nuclear utilities, and five individual nuclear electric
utilities (including GPU) are presented.
As can be seen, none of the regression coefficients, pre or post-TMI,
2
were statistically significant for GPU. Also, the R and F-ratio were
low. This indicates that for this time period the market index was of
little value in explaining the returns of GPU. Two of the utilities
(#4 and i/78) exhibited significant a- and 3„ coefficients. Since the
coefficients for the post-T^II period (a. and g. ) were not significant,
this means that the pre and post-TMI period betas are not significantly
different. The F-ratlos were statistically significant for both utili-
2
ties and the R values were .181 and .331 for /M and #78, respectively.
The two groups of utilities exhibit highly significant ^q's, 3q*s
2
and F-ratios, and higher R values. These results again indicate that
no statistically significant structural changes occurred due to the TMI
accident. These findings are consistent with a modem portfolio theory
interpretation of the TMI incident.
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Table 1: Results of a Dummy Variable Switching Regression
Technique for the Three Mile Island Accident
(n^ = 41, n^ = 30)
Utility
"o ^° ^O^mkt 1 mkt
r2 F-Ratio
General Public .397 .044 .583 -.023 .098 2.439
Utilities (.800) (.070) (1.174) (-.037) •
Co. #4 .554 .031 .443 -.028 .181 4.922**
(2.969)** (.133) (2.375)** (-.121)
Co. #19 .632 -.031 .370 .029 .091 2.233
(2.547)**(-.100) (1.490) (.093)
Co. //39 .674 -.229 .323 .232 .177 4.817**
(3.155)**(-.851) (1.513) (.863)
Co. #78 .516 -.097 .482 .099 .331 11.047**
(3.265)**(-.487) (3.055)** (.498)
17 Nuclear .591 -.013 .407 .015 .407 15.328**
Utilities (5.719)**(-.098) (3.940)** (.118)
44 Non-Nuclear .606 -.016 .393 .017 .485 21.041**
Utilities (7.204)**(-.154) (4.669)** (.164)
Note: t-values are presented in parentheses,
* indicates significance at the .05 level.
** indicates significance at the .01 level.
-15-
g Component Analysis
Beta is usefiil in making qualitative risk comparisons [Myers, 1978],
Modem portfolio theory assesses the risk of any security by its marginal
contribution to the standard deviation of returns (risk) of a portfolio.
Since the returns on any well-diversified portfolio are highly correlated
with the market portfolio, a market portfolio is used to proxy investors'
actual portfolios, and 3 is expressed [ (pR . ,R^) (aR_)]/aR , as in equation
(3).
Component values for the above three determinants of beta are shown
in Table 2 for the 40 week pre-TMI and the 31 week post-TMI periods for
the nuke and the non-nuke utility groups. The nukes and non-nukes dis-
played virtually identical p, , , a,, and, thus, 3 values before TMI.
The non-nuke total risk proxy, a , did not change after TMI, but the
systematic association of non-nuke returns and the market fell off some-
what. Market variability declined in the post-TMI period enough that
the non-nuke beta increased in spite of the lower post TMI covariance.
Nukes' beta did not change even though return variability, , , rose
from .0116 to .0134. The declines in p , , and o , offset com-
mkt,nuke mkt
pletely the a , increase. It should be noted, however, that none of
the changes in the various components were statistically significant.
Component values for GPU and the five utilities with 43-58 percent
nuclear capacity are also presented in Table 2. CPU's beta did not
change. However, the pre and post-TMI estimates of p^-,. ,. and cr
were significantly different. CPU's beta did not change in spite of
higher total risk ia ^ ) in the post-TMI period because a smaller pro-
portion of this return variability was systematically associated with
the market portfolio's returns. Component data for the five utilities
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with the largest nuclear generation capacity show a reaction by investors
to TMI that was not as severe as with GPU, but more severe than for nukes
in general. Total risk increased substantially but a much smaller share of
the Increased variability of the return distribution was systematically
associated with the returns of investors' portfolios. Thus, total risk
did not change importantly for this group.
Component values of nuke and non-nuke betas were also looked at
using 54 successive 18 week observation periods. Beta component data
for non-nukes, nukes, the 5 utility nuke group, and GPU are plotted in
Figure 5-8, respectively. These moving 18 observation data are gen-
erally consistent with the pre and post-TMI data examined above. >tore
specifically, the level of p , and a values in the pre-TMI period
(weeks 1-Al) and the post-TMI period (weeks 42-72) show the same general
magnitude.
The data for non-nukes in Figure 3 show no evidence of any changes
in the underlying beta determination process. The proxy for non-nuke
total risk, a or the standard deviation of the weekly holding period
non
returns remains fairly constant and always below a This is in contrast
to the nuke data. The nuke total risk proxy, a ,
,
parallels the non-
nuke risk proxy both in level and movement in the pre-TMI period. How-
ever, following TMI the a , estimate increases and exceeds a , through-
out most of the post-TMI period. Noteworthy, o and a , re-established*^
' non nuke
their equality of the pre-TMI period in the last three "moving 18 obser-
vation periods."
Neither the nukes nor the non-nukes experienced a detectable shift in
risk because of offsetting movements in p . , and a
,
.
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while the nuke total risk measure (c^ i^ ) Increased, the proportion of
that risk that could be associated with the risk of the market portfolio
(systematic risk) declined. As a result 6 changed little after TMI just
as modern portfolio theory suggests.
The observed increase in the standard deviation of weekly holding
period returns (a.) and decrease in p. , has practical appeal. Most
financial press stories on nuclear generation following TMI stressed the
added costs nuke utilities would encounter in the indefinite future
through constant retrofitting of their nuclear units to state-of-the-art
technology. To the extent investors reduced their earnings return ex-
pectations for nuke utilities, substantial negative price adjustment
returns (R j-'s) would occur. Conceptually, beta measures the systematic
association of R
,
and R .,. A beta estimation problem arises when
mkt equll
the equilibrium returns, R ^, are proxied by holding period returns
(R_,'s) dominated by price adjustment returns (R ..'s).
The use of total returns, R»,'s, in the estimation of beta which em-
body adjustment returns, R ,.'s, due to revised earnings expectations
adj
could cause observed changes in a. and p. , to be different than oR ,." i i,mkt equil
and pR
-ii>'^ Uf which are fundamentally unobservable. An explanation
for post-TMI nuke prices based on a change in investors' expected earn-
ings is equivalent to hypothesizing Bp^^ ^j. = Sp^^^. ^j. or no change
in risk. The data for GPU and the five nuke firms with 43-58 percent
nuclear capacity are not inconsistent with this hypothesis.
Figure 7 data for the five nukes correspond closely with the total
nuke group data. The increase in the total risk measure is greater than
for all nukes as would be expected since these five firms have the
-23-
largest nuclear capacity and, thus, the highest increased cost exposure.
CPU's total risk proxy increases dramatically following TMI because of
price adjustment returns (R j.'s) in the weekly holding period re-
turns (IL,'s). Gilster and Linke [9] have shown that estimated betas ''•'
may first decline and then rise as CPU's estimated beta did following
TMI. It is noteworthy that CPU's beta and o^ had resumed pre-TMI
\pu
levels by the last three "moving 18 month observations." A ready ex-
planation for this is that the large price adjustment returns (R j.'s)
embodied in the R™'s occurred within the first 6-8 weeks following TMI,
and were not important elements in the total returns of weeks 50-71.
This explanation has the twin advantages of being consistent with modem
capital market theory and common sense.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This paper has examined the impact the TMI accident had on investors'
risk perceptions of utilities with nuclear generating capacity. Two
methods of analysis were used to determine if the beta coefficients of
utilities changed due to TMI. Both methods indicate that the beta values
were similar before and after the TMI incident. The switching regression
method indicated the betas for the period following TMI were not signifi-
cantly different from the pre-TMI period. The beta component analysis
showed that the increased variability of holding period returns for the
nuclear utilities was offset by a decrease in the correlation between
the utilities' returns and the market's returns.
These results tend to support capital market theory. A nuclear
accident is a firm specific phenomenon, and in an efficient, well-diver-
sified market the impact on a diversified portfolio is small.
-24-
FOOTNOTES
weekly price and dividend data for the electric utilities and
weekly price data for the S&P 425 Index were obtained from ISL and
Barrens.
2
The five utilities and their respective nuclear capacity per-
centages are: Northeast Utilities 58%; Baltimore Gas & Electric, 57%;
Carolina Power & Light, 47%; Comaonwealth Edison, 45%; and ^torthern
States Power, 43%.
3
The electric utilities of the CRISP Tapes were classified using
data contained in [22,23] into five nuclear generation categories as of
April 1, 1978: (1) operating nuclear units alone; (2) operating nuclear
units jointly with other utilities; (3) building nuclear units alone;
(4) building nuclear units jointly; and (5) no nuclear generation owner-
ship. A utility that both operated its own nuclear unit as well as
operated units jointly was classified in category 1. In this study
"nukes" is used to refer to category 1 firms and "non-nukes" to refer to
category 5 firms.
'^-9.18% = R^ + B(R. - R
,
) = 8.00% + .5(8.00% - R
,
) only whenf f mkt mkt
R
, is equal to -26.367.
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